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INTRODUCTION
Congress created the Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network (“the OPTN”), a quasi-governmental agency, to allocate the
nation’s supply of deceased-donor organs. But, this agency is a shell. The
Human Resources & Services Administration contracts with a private,
non-profit corporation (the United Network for Organ Sharing or
“UNOS”) to operate the OPTN and to develop allocation policies—
based, in large part, on the medical science developed by its own
membership—in light of normative mandates from Congress and the
Department of Health & Human Services. The District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania skirted several fundamental questions
about the legitimacy and constitutionality of this arrangement when it
temporarily restrained the OPTN/UNOS from treating a ten-year-old
lung transplant candidate differently than adults in her position on the
lung waitlist;1 a subsequent transplant mooted her claim, leaving
consideration of its merits to another day. This Article picks up where
that transplant candidate’s story left off and is the first to critically
examine the OPTN/UNOS vis-à-vis issues of quasi-governmental
regulation, political oversight, judicial deference to scientific agencies,
and notice-and-comment rulemaking outside the scope of the
Administrative Procedure Act.
I. THE NETWORK
In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplant Act
(“NOTA” or “the Act”) to facilitate the development of nationwide organ
transplantation policies.2 The Act created the OPTN, a “private,

This Article treats the OPTN and UNOS as a single entity (“the OPTN/UNOS” or “the
Network”), except in cases where it draws legal or factual distinctions between the shell (the
OPTN) and its operator (UNOS).
2 National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 273 et seq. (2012)). See generally Jed A. Gross, E Pluribus UNOS:
The National Organ Transplant Act and Its Postoperative Complications, 8 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 145 (2013) (providing a comprehensive social, technological, and
legislative history leading to the passage of NOTA).
1
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nonprofit entity” charged with establishing both “a national list of
individuals who need organs” and “a national system . . . to match organs
and individuals included in the list.”3 Until this time, organ sharing had
only occurred within a voluntary network of hospitals; NOTA
“transformed th[at] voluntary network . . . into a formal [one] with
effectively mandatory membership and governance by the OPTN.”4
Since 1986, UNOS has been under contract with the Health Resources
and Services Administration (“HRSA” is a division of the U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services (“HHS” or “the Department”))
to operate the OPTN.5
The Act requires that the OPTN’s allocation policies distribute
“organs equitably among transplant patients.”6 Implementing this
directive, the Department published a final rule instructing the OPTN
Board of Directors (“the Board”) to draft policies “based on sound
medical judgment . . . to achieve the best use of donated organs” (“the
Final Rule”).7 The Final Rule authorizes the Board—comprised of
transplant physicians; transplant candidates, recipients, and family
members; and representatives of organ procurement organizations
(“OPOs”), transplant hospitals, and the general public—to develop these
policies,8 and the Board has delegated this authority to various organspecific and trans-substantive committees.9 Those committees utilize
3
42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(A); cf. Gross, supra note 2, at 250 (“Congress took pains to
emphasize the non-governmental nature of the network, for example, by calling it the ‘Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network’ . . . rather than the ‘United States Transplantation
Network’ . . . .” (citation omitted)).
4 DAVID L. WEIMER, MEDICAL GOVERNANCE: VALUES, EXPERTISE, AND INTERESTS IN
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 73 (2010).
5 UNOS
is
a
private
non-profit
organization.
About,
UNOS,
http://www.unos.org/about/index.php/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). UNOS was established in
1977 by the privately incorporated South-Eastern Regional Organ Procurement Foundation—
a voluntary network of eighteen transplant centers that had grown out of an organization
originally funded by the Public Health Service in 1969—to facilitate donor-recipient organ
matching. WEIMER, supra note 4, at 45 (“[B]y 1983, UNOS was the only organization
operating a nationwide system to support organ sharing.” (citation omitted)). See generally
Wisconsin v. Shalala, No. 00-C-155-C, 2000 WL 34234002, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 22, 2000)
(noting that the OPTN-operator contract with UNOS has been renewed several times).
6 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(D) (emphasis added).
7
42 C.F.R. § 121.8(a)(1)–(2) (2015); see Organ Procurement & Transplantation
Network, 63 Fed. Reg. 16,296, 16,297 (April 2, 1998), codified at 42 C.F.R. § 121.
8 See 42 C.F.R. § 121.3(a); id. § 121.4(a); see also Final Rule, OPTN,
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/about-the-optn/final-rule/ (last visited Nov. 7,
2016); Stuart C. Sweet & Gena Boyle, The OPTN/UNOS Policy Development Cycle:
Challenges and Opportunities, 3 CURRENT TRANSPLANTATION REPORTS 75, 75–78 (2016)
(describing “the typical policy development process” to include (1) identification of a
problem, (2) developing a policy proposal, (3) public comment, and (4) post-implementation
monitoring), available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40472-016-0086-9.
9 The organ-specific committees are Kidney, Liver & Intestinal Organ, Pancreas, and
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Network-specific notice-and-comment procedures,10 which allow for
input from the Network’s membership and other interested parties.11 Yet,
the Final Rule purports to establish that “significant” policies
promulgated by the Network are not “enforceable” until approved by the
Secretary of HHS (“the Secretary”).12
Regardless, while the Network is responsible for establishing
allocation policies, it falls to fifty-eight federally-designated OPOs to
apply those policies during the real-time distribution of organs to patients
awaiting transplantation (“candidates”).13 Each of these OPOs facilitates
transplants from deceased donors within its exclusive geographically
defined donation service area (“DSA”) to candidates at transplant centers
around the country.14 Ten years after NOTA was signed into law,
Congress amended the Social Security Act to require—as a prerequisite
to Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement—that hospitals and OPOs
comply with Network policies (including establishing agreements
whereby hospitals notify OPOs of potential organ donors).15
Once a person is consented to be an organ donor,16 the local OPO
Thoracic Organ. Committees, OPTN, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members/
committees/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). And, the trans-substantive committees normally
involved in organ allocation policy development include Ethics, Executive,
Histocompatibility, Membership & Professional Standards, Minority Affairs, OPO, Patient
Affairs, Pediatric Transplantation, and Policy Oversight. Id.
10 42
C.F.R.
§ 121.4(b)(1);
see
Making
OPTN
Policy,
OPTN,
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/policies/making-optn-policy/
(last
visited
Nov.
7,
2016);
see
also
Policy
Notices,
OPTN,
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/policy-notices/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016); Public
Comment, OPTN, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/public-comment/ (last visited
Nov. 7, 2016).
11 See Martin A. Strosberg & Ron W. Gimbel, The Public Administration of Organ
Allocation: Maintaining the Public-Private Partnership, 7 PUB. ADMIN. & MGMT. 229, 232
(“UNOS . . . adopts policies with organized input from the public and the general
membership.”). The independent organizational members of the OPTN/UNOS include 254
transplant centers, fifty-eight OPOs, fifty-eight histocompatibility laboratories, and thirty
professional and voluntary organizations. See WEIMER, supra note 4, at 51.
12 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(b)(2).
13 About
AOPO, ASSOCIATION OF ORGAN PROCUREMENT ORGANIZATIONS,
http://www.aopo.org/about-aopo/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016); see WEIMER, supra note 4, at 49
(“Each OPO has a monopoly over procuring organs from cadavers in hospitals within its
geographic area. Fifty of the OPOs are independent organizations that harvest cadaveric
organs from multiple hospitals. The other eight are operated by transplant centers based in
specific hospitals and do not hold independent membership in the OPTN.”).
14 WEIMER, supra note 4, at 49. Transplant centers are hospitals where transplants are
performed. 42 C.F.R. § 121.2; see OPO Report, SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT
RECIPIENTS, http://www.srtr.org/csr/current/opo-report.aspx/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
15 Social Security Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-432, 108 Stat. 4398
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8(a)(1) (2012)).
16 This may be either by first-person consent (e.g., during registration at the DMV), or
by the consent of the donor’s legal next-of-kin.
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uploads the donor’s social and medical information onto an online
UNOS-operated donor-recipient matching system called DonorNetSM.17
Using DonorNetSM, an OPO representative generates one or more organspecific “matchruns” that sort and rank all the candidates who may be
compatible for each organ to be offered.18 The sequence of candidates
on each unique matchrun is determined automatically based on
algorithms that reflect the allocation policies that are operative at the time
the matchrun is generated.19
While the allocation policies vary by organ type, they all share some
commonalities.20 First, with few exceptions, organs from deceased
donors are initially offered to candidates geographically nearest the
donor, then to candidates farther away. 21 Second, despite the Act’s
mandate to distribute organs “equitably,” the Network is still expected to
specifically “address the unique health care needs of children.”22 So, all
allocation policies include some division between children and adults.23
Third, all allocation policies provide transplant surgeons discretion when
considering offers for candidates listed at their center since “decisions
about who should receive a particular organ in a particular situation
involve levels of detail, subtlety and urgency that must be judged by
transplant professionals.”24
II. THE CASE
In December 2011, the transplant team at Children’s Hospital of
Philadelphia (“CHOP”) sought to employ its discretion when it
determined that Sarah Murnaghan—a then-ten-year-old girl with cystic
fibrosis listed for a bilateral lung transplant—was medically eligible to
receive lungs from an adult where the donor’s lungs would be
“downsized” to fit her.25 Due to her progressively worsening health,
17

How organs are matched, UNOS, https://www.unos.org/transplantation/
matching-organs/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Complaint for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [hereinafter
Complaint], Exhibit C (Letter from John P. Roberts, President, OPTN/UNOS, to Kathleen
Sebelius, Secretary, HHS [hereinafter Roberts] Murnaghan v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-03083,
2013 WL 3363500 (E.D. Penn. June 5, 2013)).
21 See id. (noting that geographic proximity minimizes organ preservation time and
maximizes the chance of a successful transplant).
22 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(M).
23 See generally Policies, OPTN, available at https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/
governance/policies.
24 See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,650, 56,652
(Oct. 20, 1999).
25 See Complaint, supra note 20, at 10–11; see also Roberts, supra note 20 (noting that
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Sarah was admitted to CHOP in May 2013. 26 Unfortunately for Sarah,
high-quality lungs from adult donors were being routinely accepted for
adult candidates who were ranked ahead of her on the waitlist due to the
so-called “Under 12 Rule.”27
A. The Under 12 Rule
The Network’s lung allocation policy draws a distinction between
those individuals age twelve or older and those under twelve years old.28
On the one hand, if a candidate is age twelve or older, their medical team
will calculate a lung allocation score (“LAS”), which provides transplant
physicians with a quantitative assessment of the candidate’s mortality
before—and survival benefit after—transplantation.29 A candidate’s
priority on lung matchruns is based on their LAS: candidates with a
higher LAS receive offers first within their DSA.30 On the other hand,
candidates under age twelve do not receive an LAS score.31 As a result,
these pre-adolescent candidates are last in line to receive offers from adult
donors, after all adolescent and adult candidates have refused. 32

some thoracic transplant surgeons opt to excise one or more lobes from a larger donor’s lungs
for transplant into a smaller recipient and that studies have shown that outcomes are
comparable to whole lung transplants despite the added complexity).
26 Complaint, supra note 20, at 3.
27 Hearing Regarding Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [hereinafter TRO
Hearing], Murnaghan, 2013 WL 3363500, at 27:00–28:01. In the months following her
admission, Sarah’s transplant team received and rejected several lung offers that already had
been refused by higher-ranked adult candidates, which they considered to be of inadequate
medical quality. Id. at 33:10.
28 See generally Sarah O’Brien, The Impact and Implications of Sarah Murnaghan on
the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network’s Lung Allocation Policy and a
Proposal for Further Change, 18 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 99, 111–17 (2015).
29 Roberts, supra note 20 (the LAS is based in part on the candidate’s medical diagnosis,
blood analyses, and lung function).
30 Roberts, supra note 20.
31 Why the Under 12 Rule was promulgated is a matter of some debate in the medical
community. Compare Keren Ladin & Douglas W. Hanto, Rationing Lung Transplants—
Procedural Fairness in Allocation and Appeals, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 599, 599 (2013)
(“Such scores were assigned only to patients 12 or older, because there were insufficient data
to support their applicability to younger populations, owing to their different diagnoses and
limited outcomes data.” (citation omitted)) with Thomas M. Egan & Stuart C. Sweet,
Rationing Lung Transplants, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2064, 2064 (2013) (“Ladin and Hanto
ignore critical references. The decision to exclude children younger than 12 years of age from
receiving allocation scores was based on careful data review; it did not result from insufficient
data.”) (citation omitted)). See also Ciera Parish, Rules Are Meant to Be Broken: The Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network Should Allow Pediatric Transplantation of Adult
Lungs, 28 J.L. & HEALTH 319, 333–36 (2015) (describing the purpose of the Under 12 Rule).
32 Roberts, supra note 20.
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B. The Secretary
Around the time of her admission to CHOP, Sarah’s parents sought
to change the Under 12 Rule by publishing a petition to be delivered to
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius and Board President Dr. John P. Roberts.33
In response, the Network stated that the Murnaghans’ request for special
review could not be considered.34 Nevertheless, on May 31, 2013,
Secretary Sebelius directed the Network to “identify[] any potential
improvements to th[e lung allocation] policy that would make more
transplants available to children, consistent with the requirements of the
[Final Rule].”35
On June 3, 2013, Sarah’s parents’ attorney wrote to Secretary
Sebelius, arguing that the Under 12 Rule was flawed and discriminatory,
and directly requesting that the Secretary suspend the rule for Sarah on
an emergency basis.36 The next day, at an unrelated budgetary hearing
before the House Education and Labor Committee, three congressmen
pressed Sebelius to grant the Murnaghans’ request.37 One congressman,
in particular, compared Sarah’s situation to “deny[ing] a[n] organ
transplant based on somebody’s race, . . . skin [color], . . . or
gender . . . .”38 Sebelius refused, suggesting that the allocation “rules that
are in place and reviewed on a regular basis are there because the worst
of all worlds in my mind is to have some individual pick and choose who
lives and who dies. I think you want a process where it’s guided by
medical science and medical experts.”39
33 See
Allow Transplant of Adult Lungs to Children, CHANGE.ORG,
http://www.change.org/petitions/allow-transplants-of-adult-lungs-to-children/ (last visited
Nov. 12, 2016).
34 OPTN statement regarding lung transplantation and pediatric priority, OPTN (May
27,
2013),
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/news/optn-statement-regarding-lungtransplantation-and-pediatric-priority/ (“OPTN policies allow status adjustments for
specifically defined groups of candidates with unique medical circumstances not addressed
by the overall policy. A request to adjust the status of a patient under age 12 so that they may
be included in the allocation sequence for adolescents and adults is not within the scope of
the existing lung allocation policy.”).
35 Complaint, Exhibit G (Letter from Secretary Sebelius to Dr. Roberts), supra note 20.
See generally 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(d) (If “[a]ny interested individual” submits to the Secretary
comments critical of the OPTN’s policies, the Secretary will consider those comments, and
upon review, may take any action the Secretary deems appropriate, including “direct[ing] the
OPTN to revise the policies or practices.”).
36 Complaint, Exhibit A (Letter from Stephen G. Harvey, attorney representing Sarah
Murnaghan, to Secretary Sebelius), supra note 20 (noting that the Network’s review of the
lung allocation policy could take months, during which Sarah would die).
37 See Rep. John Kline Holds a Hearing on the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Budget
Before the H. Educ. & Labor Comm., 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter HHS Hearing]
(statements of Reps. Thomas Price, Lou Barletta, and Glenn Thompson).
38 Id. (statement of Rep. Lou Barletta).
39 Id. (statement of Sec’y Kathleen Sebelius).
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C. The Order
On June 5, 2013, Sarah’s parents filed a motion in the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”) enjoining the Secretary and the Network from applying the
Under 12 Rule.40 The complaint alleged two overarching violations of
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”): (1) that the Under 12 Rule
was “not in accordance with law;” and (2) that the Secretary’s failure to
set it aside was “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.”41
During a hearing held the same day, Sarah’s pulmonologist testified that
the Under 12 Rule was “arbitrary;” 42 that Sarah would only survive two
to four more weeks without a transplant;43 and that, were Sarah assigned
an LAS, she would have a high chance of receiving lungs before her
death.44
The court issued the TRO, limiting its application to Sarah.45 That
night, UNOS adjusted its allocation algorithm to implement the order.46
In a supplemental memorandum to its order, the court noted that the TRO
did not direct a lung to Sarah, or place Sarah at the front of the line for
lungs; rather, the order merely restrained the Network from
disadvantaging Sarah based on her age.47
On June 6, 2013, the OPTN/UNOS Thoracic and Pediatric
Committees convened an emergency joint teleconference to “determine
40

Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 18.
Id. ¶¶ 52–62.
42 TRO Hearing, supra note 27, at 17:43.
43 TRO Hearing, supra note 27, at 22:30.
44 TRO Hearing, supra note 27, at 29:00 (noting that Sarah would be listed in the ninetyfifth percentile in terms of medical severity).
45 Order, Murnaghan, 2013 WL 3363500, at 2 (June 5, 2013). That said, the mother of
another child waiting on the lung waitlist—an eleven-year-old named Javier Martinez—
obtained a similar TRO and preliminary injunction from the same court the very next day,
represented by the Murnaghans’ attorney. See Parish, supra note 31, at 338–39 (citations
omitted).
46 Roberts, supra note 20.
47 Supplemental Mem., Murnaghan, 2013 WL 3363500, at 2 (June 7, 2013). This was a
repetition of a caveat the court announced during the TRO hearing. See TRO Hearing, supra
note 27, at 41:57–43:25 (“I want to emphasize what the legal issue on the TRO is, as I
understand it. And I think this is very important, that, I am not in a position—nor would I
seek to be—to decide who gets a transplant. That’s not the function of a judge. The legal
issue that’s presented is that the Under 12 Rule is an ‘arbitrary’ and ‘capricious’ rule that is
[sic] been improperly put into effect by the Secretary of HHS and that it should not block—it
should not be used to block—Sarah from getting a transplant. And that is really the only legal
issue. So, if I were to grant the TRO, it would only apply to Sarah. And it would not guarantee
that she would get a transplant. It would only mean that the Secretary and the people who
administer the donor program could not keep her in a separate category of ‘Under 12.’ They
would have to consider her as equal to adults. So, what I’m being asked to decide here is a
narrow legal issue.”).
41
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if there was sufficient evidence available to support a recommendation to
modify the current pediatric lung allocation policy urgently.”48 After a
review of data provided by the Scientific Registry of Transplant
Recipients, the Committees jointly recommended that “the Executive
Committee [not] take any emergency policy actions . . . regarding
pediatric lung allocation.”49
Likewise, the OPTN/UNOS Ethics
Committee saw “significant ethical risk in special review, appeal, or
exceptions to allocation policies based on a particular candidate’s
circumstance beyond the exception and review procedures already
incorporated into Network policy.”50 In particular, the Committee
expressed concern that the
circumvention of organ allocation through judicial
appeals . . . is likely to undermine the main ethical directive
of an equitable allocation system to maximize the public good
and achieve justice. Politicians and judges who intervene in a
complex allocation algorithm may be well-intentioned but
fail to consider all the moral variables that must be balanced
at the macro level rather
than through an individual
candidate’s experience.51
After reviewing these reports, the Executive Committee decided, on June
10, to permit transplant centers the opportunity to seek individual
exceptions permitting children below age twelve to avoid the Under 12
Rule.52 Sarah’s transplant team immediately sought—and was granted—
48
Report of Joint Meeting of the OPTN/UNOS Thoracic and Pediatric Committees to
the OPTN/UNOS Executive Committee (June 10, 2013), https://web.archive.org
/web/20140818205607/http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_Co
mm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf/ (“The members of the Committees understood that such
an extreme action should be recommended only if the review of current available evidence
demonstrated the presence of a systematic, disproportional, imminent disadvantage to
children as a result of the current allocation system.”).
49 Id.
50 Memorandum of OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee to OPTN/UNOS Executive
Committee (June 10, 2013) [hereinafter Ethics Memo], https://web.archive.org/web
/20140818205607/http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_Comm_
mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf/ (“Appeal to the unique features of specific cases is not an
appropriate approach to make fairness claims against the complex algorithm of an allocation
policy.”); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607,
1610 (2016) (“Judges face their own challenges. . . . [T]heir information is partial and
fragmentary, often a kind of cartoon. It is a product of the adversary process, run by lawyers,
which can lead to distorted and wildly inadequate perspectives. Judges cannot possibly have
an adequate sense of the full range of issues with which executive officials must deal.”
(citations omitted)).
51 Ethics Memo, supra note 50; see Ladin & Hanto, supra note 31, at 599 (“Appeals
waged through federal courts and the court of public opinion . . . undermine fairness. . . .
Lawsuits also inappropriately saddle courts with decisions about health policy. Finally,
appeals reduce transparency and predictability, undermining the public perception of fairness,
which could reduce donation rates.”).
52 Summary of Actions Taken at June 10, 2013, OPTN/UNOS Executive Committee
Meeting (June 11, 2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20150415092740
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such an exception.53
No longer encumbered by the Under 12 Rule, Sarah underwent a
bilateral lung transplant from an adult donor on June 12.54 Unfortunately,
those lungs failed almost immediately, forcing Sarah onto a heart-lung
bypass machine for three days before she could be re-transplanted with a
second pair of adult lungs.55 No longer dependent on the operation of the
TRO, and hence without the need to convert the TRO into a preliminary
injunction, the Murnaghans dismissed their suit.56
Due to the dismissal, the court never reached the merits of Sarah’s
claim, i.e., it never received briefing on NOTA, the OPTN, UNOS, the
Final Rule, or the Under 12 Rule. Indeed, the court appears to have issued
the TRO on the assumption that organ allocation policies such as the
Under 12 Rule are “regulation[s]” due deference under Chevron:
[O]ne of the damning aspects of a regulation is that it’s
arbitrary, and that is an allegation that the plaintiff has
made in her complaint here: that it is an arbitrary rule
and is without medical basis. And, I think that is
something that has a lot of weight. What is a strong
factor in favor of the defendant is the concept of judicial
deference to administrative rulemaking and
administrative agency expertise.
This is commonly
known as the Chevron rule.57
The remainder of this Article examines this assumption in the context of
a several potentially dispositive legal issues that deserved, but did not
receive, attention in Murnaghan.
Part III posits that the OPTN is a legally valid quasi-governmental

/http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/Policy_Notice_06-2013.pdf. Of note,
this exception-based scheme has since become a permanent component of Network policy.
See O’Brien, supra note 28, at 155 (“After a period of public comment and a vote by the
OPTN, the temporary mechanism became permanent on June 23, 2014.” (citations omitted));
OPTN, POLICY 10: ALLOCATION OF LUNGS, § 10.2.B, Lung Candidates with Exceptional
Cases (Oct. 1, 2016), https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/
media/1200/optn_policies.pdf (“For lung candidates less than 12 years old, transplant
programs may request classification as an adolescent candidate. . . .”).
53 Joint Motion to Postpone Preliminary Injunction Hearing and to Extend Temporary
Restraining Order, Murnaghan, 2013 WL 3363500, at 2 (June 13, 2013).
54 Maryclaire Dale & Malcolm Ritter, Sarah Murnaghan’s Surgery Deemed a Success,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 12, 2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20160304104700
/http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/12/sarah-murnaghan-surgery_n_3431653.html.
55 Marie McCullough, Five grave problems reduce Sarah’s survival chances, THE
INQUIRER (July 3, 2013) (noting that these lungs would normally have been unsuitable for
transplant due to pneumonia in the donor), https://web.archive.org/web
/20150920232952/http://articles.philly.com/2013-07-03/news/40331491_1_lungstransplant-surgery-sarah-murnaghan.
56 Notice of Dismissal Without Prejudice, Murnaghan, 2013 WL 3363500, at 1 (July 8,
2013).
57 TRO Hearing, supra note 27, at 47:56–48:41.
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agency, and that UNOS, as its operator, is authorized to promulgate
binding organ allocation policies. Part IV challenges the Department’s
Final Rule, arguing that, despite its procedural validity, Congress never
authorized the Secretary to substantively intervene in the Network’s
policymaking. Part V argues that, though the Network’s allocation
policies are not subject to the APA, they are nonetheless due some
equitable form of judicial deference. Finding that these policies reflect
the Network’s interpretation of a statute (NOTA) and not of a regulation
(the Final Rule), this Part concludes that Chevron deference may be
appropriate on the assumption that a court is willing to suspend the
political accountability norm that is normally a prerequisite to deference
to agency interpretations of organic statutes.
Finally, after considering whether the Network is a state actor
susceptible to constitutional challenges, the Article concludes with a call
to balance relief from alleged violations of constitutional rights with the
inherently more abstract concerns of next-in-line candidates and the
public.
III. NOTA
For the Network’s allocation system to survive constitutional
scrutiny, two showings must be made. First, NOTA must meet the
demands of the Supreme Court’s nondelegation doctrine. Second, the
Network must be able to prove that its policies are designed with
scientific expertise that is insulated from political interference.
A. Nondelegation
Eight decades have passed since the Court has struck down a statute
for delegating authority either without an “intelligible principle,” 58 or to
a private entity.59 Because NOTA requires the Network to distribute
“organs equitably among transplant patients” and “address the unique
health care needs of children,”60 there is unquestionably an “intelligible
principle” that the Network must abide.61
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (“In the history of
the Court we have found the requisite ‘intelligible principle’ lacking in only two statutes, one
of which provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which
conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard
than stimulating the economy by assuring ‘fair competition.’” (citing Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935))).
59 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (noting that delegation of
regulatory authority to a private entity is “legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form”).
60 See 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(D), (M).
61 This is not to say that there are not critics of the “intelligible principle” doctrine. See,
58
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And, until very recently, there would been no doubt about
Congress’s decision to delegate allocative policymaking authority to the
Network.62 Indeed, Carter Coal was considered a “dormant doctrine”
until 2013,63 when the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that Congress had impermissibly delegated legislative power
to Amtrak, which was—in the Circuit’s view—a private entity.64 The
Supreme Court ultimately vacated the judgment,65 finding instead that
Amtrak is a governmental entity,66 thereby avoiding the Circuit’s
attempted revival of Carter Coal. In separate concurring opinions,
however, two Justices indicated that Carter Coal’s ban on private
delegation may have traction in future cases.67
Emboldened by these concurrences, future lower court decisions
may strive to prompt the Court to revive Carter Coal. And, given that the
Network is almost certainly more private than Amtrak, a case like Sarah
Murnaghan’s could squarely tee up the nondelegation doctrine.68 But,
with six sitting Justices silent on the issue, there is no indication that a
majority would be willing to strike down NOTA as an unconstitutional
delegation of authority to a private entity.
e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s (“American Railroads”), 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1246,
1250 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Although the Court may never have
intended the boundless standard the ‘intelligible principle’ test has become, it is evident that
it does not adequately reinforce the Constitution’s allocation of legislative power. . . .
[P]erhaps we deliberately . . . bow[ed] to the exigencies of modern Government that were so
often cited in cases upholding challenged delegations of rulemaking authority.” (citing, e.g.,
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“[I]n our increasingly complex society,
replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”))).
62 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 586 (2000) (“[T]he nondelegation doctrine seems increasingly out of step with
modern governance.”).
63 Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 900–
01 (2014) (citing Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367,
1440 (2003)).
64 See Ass’n of Am. R.R.s. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 674–77 (D.C. Cir.
2013), vacated and remanded sub nom. American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225.
65 American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. at 1233–34 (remanding for consideration of the
remaining constitutional issues).
66
Id. at 1228.
67 See id. at 1237–38 (Alito, J., concurring) (“When it comes to private entities, however,
there is not even a fig leaf of constitutional justification. . . . By any measure, handing off
regulatory power to a private entity is ‘legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form.’”
(quoting Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311)); id. at 1252 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“Because a private entity is neither Congress, nor the President or one of his agents, nor the
Supreme Court or an inferior court established by Congress, the Vesting Clauses would
categorically preclude it from exercising the legislative, executive, or judicial powers of the
Federal Government.”).
68 See infra Part V.C.2.
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B. Constraints
Separate from any private-delegation concerns, the Network
operates to some degree as a scientific agency, which means that when
developing allocation policy, the Network is constrained by two
interrelated “expertise-forcing” requirements:69 primarily, its policy
choices must be genuinely coupled with “significant expertise;”70 and, as
a corollary, that expertise must be insulated from the influence of the
political branches.71
i. Expertise
The Court has found evidence of “significant expertise” when
Congress requires a medical regulatory “program [to] evolve as
technological expertise mature[s].”72 Here, Congress expects not only
that transplantation medicine will “evolve,” but that the Network itself
will be the entity driving “technological expertise matur[ation].”73
Indeed, unlike “[r]egulatory science” agencies, like the EPA, which are
“generally not concerned with . . . advancing the pantheon of human
knowledge,”74 Congress tasked the OPTN’s leadership not only with
developing allocation policy, but also with “improv[ing]” the science of

69 See Adrian Vermeule & Jody Freeman, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52 (2007) (“Expertise-forcing is the attempt by courts to
ensure that agencies exercise expert judgment free from outside political pressures, even or
especially political pressures emanating from the White House or political appointees in the
agencies.”).
70 See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991) (“The identification
and classification of medical eligibility criteria necessarily require significant expertise and
entail the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns. In those circumstances, courts
appropriately defer to the agency entrusted by Congress to make such policy
determinations.”); see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (“An agency . . .
acquire[s] special authority to interpret its own words when . . . using its expertise and
experience to formulate a regulation . . . .” (citation omitted)).
71 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (holding that, where Congress
mandates agency action following the agency’s determination of certain circumstances, the
agency may not pursue contrary presidential priorities absent a “reasonable explanation as to
why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion”); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000) (“[N]o matter how ‘important, conspicuous, and
controversial’ the issue, and regardless of how likely the public is to hold the Executive
Branch politically accountable, an administrative agency’s power to regulate in the public
interest must always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress.”).
72 See BethEnergy, 501 U.S. at 697.
73 Cf. id. (deferring to Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of black-lung medical-benefit
regulations where the Secretary “will make every effort to incorporate within his
regulations . . . to the extent feasible the advances made by medical science . . . .” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
74 See Louis J. Virelli III, Scientific Peer Review and Administrative Legitimacy, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 723, 736 (2009).
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transplantation.75 This coupling of responsibilities makes the Network
rare (if not unique) among governmental and quasi-governmental
entities, and indicates congressional recognition of “significant
expertise” sufficient to justify the Network’s authority. 76
On the other hand, one could reasonably contend that the Network’s
ability to “improve” transplantation science does not necessarily qualify
the Network to develop allocation policy.77 But, a brief examination of
UNOS’s history refutes this argument. Whereas the typical scientific
agency regulates entities that have no experience in self-regulation,
Congress constructed the OPTN on top of an existing network of
transplant centers that—prior to the Federal Government’s
involvement—independently and successfully allocated organs.78
Indeed, it was this very experience that Congress sought to harness in
promulgating NOTA.79
75 See 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(I), (N) (“The [OPTN] shall . . . collect, analyze, and publish
data concerning organ donation and transplants [and] carry out studies and demonstration
projects for the purpose of improving procedures for organ donation procurement and
allocation . . . .”); cf. id. § 274(b)(1)(B) (“The [OPTN] shall . . . have a board of directors that
includes representatives of [OPOs], transplant centers, [and] voluntary health
associations . . . .”).
76 The Final Rule takes a similar approach in demanding that the Network consistently
review its policies with an eye toward the application of its expertise. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 121.4(e)(2) (“The OPTN shall implement policies and shall . . . [u]pdate policies developed
in accordance with this section to accommodate scientific and technological advances.”).
77 See Strosberg & Gimbel, supra note 11, at 244 (“[T]ransplant professionals have no
particular expertise on deciding on the tradeoffs between utility and equity. These tradeoffs
and associated policies are better made by politicians than transplant professionals.” (citing
ROBERT VEATCH, TRANSPLANTATION ETHICS (2000))). See generally Holly Doremus & A.
Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUB.
LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 17 (2005) (“[T]he real battleground in arguments about the
use of science . . . is typically not the data . . . but the . . . judgments used to interpret and
translate the data into regulations.”).
78 WEIMER, supra note 4, at 95 (“Voluntary sharing by UNOS was already under way
when the OPTN was created, so that its members had considerable experience with
cooperating as well as plausible starting points from which allocation policy could begin to
evolve.”).
79 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 98th Cong. 175 (1983) [hereinafter NOTA Hearing] (statement of Rep. Al Gore)
(“We have heard three times now the statement that, what is proposed is a Federal
Government takeover of the system when, in fact, nothing of the sort is proposed. The private
systems would continue in place. The program would still be run by the same people.”); see
David L. Weimer, Public and Private Regulation of Organ Transplantation: Liver Allocation
and the Final Rule, 32 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y & L. 9, 44 (2007) (“OPTN committees have
a heavy representation of transplant surgeons who bring the sort of tacit knowledge—
information and understanding based on firsthand experience and observation—that is
extremely useful in identifying potential issues . . . [and] in predicting the likely consequences
of proposed rule changes. Many of these surgeons also contribute to the medical literature on
transplantation, which gives them considerable experience in dealing with empirical
evidence.”). Contra, e.g., Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 266–67 (“The structure of the [Controlled
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ii. Insulation
But, even Congress’s recognition of “significant expertise” is not
enough to meet the expertise-forcing requirement unless the Network can
also demonstrate that NOTA satisfies the political-insulation corollary in
two ways: one legal, one factual. First, as a matter of law, the Network
can show that there is no statutory conduit through which political
influence may validly affect substantive changes to allocation policy. 80
Here, NOTA only authorizes procedural checks by the Secretary. 81
Moreover, even assuming that—in certain contexts—a substantive
executive regulation may open a conduit for political influence, this is not
that context. Though the Final Rule purports to endow the Secretary with
substantive override authority, that authority is ultra vires of NOTA.82
Hence, as a matter of law, the Network is insulated from political
influence.
Second, even if, as a matter of law, NOTA did authorize the
involvement of the political branches in substantive allocation
policymaking, the Network could demonstrate that any particular policy
being challenged was, as a matter of fact, promulgated free of such
influence.83 During a congressional hearing years after the promulgation
of the Under 12 Rule, Secretary Sebelius resisted political pressure to
intervene in Sarah’s case,84 clarifying that “the OPTN . . . is not
bureaucrats, it’s transplant surgeons and health care providers,” and that
these experts develop allocation policy “based on their best medical
judgment of the most appropriate way to decide allocation in an

Substances Act], then, conveys unwillingness to cede medical judgments to an executive
official [the Attorney General] who lacks medical expertise.” (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)).
80 See Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533 (finding that where congressional design mandates
the use of policymaking authority by a scientific agency, contrary political priorities may not
interfere); see also Vermeule & Freeman, supra note 69, at 89 (“State Farm is expertiseforcing in the sense that the Court expects the agency to make discretionary policy decisions
that can be justified by the relevant statutory factors, and not politics.”). Contra Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A change in administration brought
about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive
agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations.”).
81 See infra Part IV.B.1.
82 See infra Part IV.B.2.
83 See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42 (holding that “a reviewing court may not set aside an
agency rule that is rational [and] based on consideration of the relevant factors”).
84 See HHS Hearing, supra note 37 (statement of Rep. Barletta) (“[Y]ou are the one
person who has the authority to suspend the current policy until we are confident that children
have equal access to lifesaving treatment and aren’t discriminated against because of their
age. . . . I’m begging you. Sarah has three to five weeks to live. Time is running out. Please,
suspend the rules until we look at this policy, which we all believe is flawed.”).
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impossibly difficult situation.”85 In essence, Secretary Sebelius was
contending that the Under 12 Rule was an allocation policy
promulgated—as a matter of fact—by the Network using its “best
medical judgment,”86 and that it would be inappropriate for the policy to
be superseded by politics.
IV. THE FINAL RULE
The Department’s attempt to establish substantive override authority
through the Final Rule, then, was invalid. While the Final Rule was
promulgated in technical compliance with the APA, its provision
purporting to authorize the Secretary to oversee the substance of the
Network’s allocation policies has no statutory foundation and is an
example of impermissible self-aggrandizement by an agency.
A. Promulgation
On September 8, 1994, the Department published a notice of
proposed rulemaking for a rule governing the operation of the OPTN.87
The rule would have required the OPTN to propose policies to the
Secretary; and, “[i]f the Secretary object[ed] to a policy, the OPTN may
[have] be[en] directed to revise the policy consistent with the Secretary’s
direction.”88 The proposed rule “recognized the [OPTN]’s exclusive
statutory authority to develop organ allocation policy,” but reserved for
the Secretary the power to oversee policy development in order to ensure
that allocation remained “fair and equitable.”89 Most transplant centers

85 See id. (statement of Sec’y Sebelius). See generally NOTA Hearing, supra note 79, at
2 (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman) (“We must also avoid the chaos and bitterness that
inevitably will arise if transplants are available only to . . . those fortunate enough to be
singled out by the media for special attention.”). At the time the Secretary made her remarks,
she may have been acutely sensitive to the issue of political influence in agency rulemaking.
An April 5, 2013 order issued out of the District Court for the Eastern District of New York
had included language that her then-recent decision regarding Plan B availability had been
“arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.” Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 187
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]hree distinguished scientists, including the Editor-in-Chief of the New
England Journal of Medicine, wrote: ‘In our opinion, the secretary’s decision to retain behindthe-counter status for Plan B One-Step was based on politics rather than science.’” (quoting
Alastair J.J. Wood, Jeffrey M. Drazen, & Michael F. Greene, The Politics of Emergency
Contraception, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 102 (2012))).
86 Cf. HHS Hearing, supra note 37 (statement of Sec’y Sebelius) (“What I have been told
by the transplant experts—and I don’t profess to have any expertise in this area—is that . . . a
delineation between pediatric and adult lungs [is] based on . . . survivability . . . .”).
87 Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,482, 46,496 (Sept.
8, 1994).
88 Id. at 46,498.
89 Wisconsin, 2000 WL 34234002, at *4.
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responded “cool[ly],” preferring “minimal federal oversight.” 90 The
Department did not adopt the proposed rule.91
But, two years later, on November 13, 1996, the Department revived
the rulemaking, reopened the docket for comments, and held a three-day
hearing where “[m]ore than one hundred witnesses testified,
and . . . more than six hundred [unique] letters were submitted . . . .”92
Nearly ninety-nine percent of physicians, and more than ninety percent
of patients and families, opposed a stronger government role in allocation
policy development.93
Then, on April 2, 1998, the Department announced a final rule.94 In
the section “OPTN policies: Secretarial review and appeals,” the
regulation read:
The Board of Directors shall . . . [p]rovide . . . proposed
policies to the Secretary, who may provide comments and/or
objections . . . . If the Secretary objects to the policy, the
OPTN may be directed to revise the policy consistent with
the Secretary’s direction. [I]f the Secretary . . . disagrees with
[the revised] content, the Secretary may take
such other
action as the Secretary determines appropriate.95
Then-Secretary Donna Shalala announced that this rule would “vest[]
ultimate control of organ allocation policy with [the Secretary] instead of
with the [OPTN].”96 Resistance to the rule mounted in the transplant

90

WEIMER, supra note 4, at 77.
Wisconsin, 2000 WL 34234002, at *4.
92 WEIMER, supra note 4, at 78–79.
93 WEIMER, supra note 4, at 79 (citation omitted).
94 See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.
95 63 Fed. Reg. at 16,334, codified at 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(b)(2).
96 Wisconsin, 2000 WL 34234002, at *4; Dulcinea A. Grantham, Transforming
Transplantation: The Effect of the Health and Human Services Final Rule on the Organ
Allocation System, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 751, 780 (2001) (“This provision gives the Secretary the
power to unilaterally accept or reject any policy proposed by OPTN.” (citing 42 C.F.R.
§ 121.4(b))).
91
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community and Congress.97 After nearly two years of delays,98 the
Department responded by including a new subsection in the Federal
Register titled “Discussions with the Transplant Community: Secretarial
Oversight and Enforceability of OPTN Policies”:
It is not the desire, nor is it the intention, of the department to
interfere in the practice of medicine. Decisions about who
should receive a particular organ in a particular situation
involve levels of detail, subtlety and urgency that must be
judged by transplant professionals . . . . [T]he Secretary’s
review is intended to99 ensure consistency between OPTN
policies and [NOTA].
Notwithstanding this protestation, the language of the Final Rule itself
nonetheless purports to vest in the Secretary precisely the same oversight
authority proposed in 1994, 1996, and 1998.
Procedurally, the consistency of content in the Final Rule satisfies
the rather lax “logical outgrowth” doctrine.100 Under this doctrine, “an
agency, in its notice of proposed rulemaking, need not identify precisely
every potential regulatory change, [but] the notice must be sufficiently
descriptive to provide interested parties with a fair opportunity to
comment and to participate in the rulemaking.”101 Here, the only
substantive change to the oversight provision from the original proposal
was that the Secretary would be required to “refer significant proposed
polices to the Advisory Committee on Organ Transplantation” before
recommending reconsideration or requiring modification.102 Given that
the transplant community had a full opportunity to—and did—voice its
concerns about the Secretary’s claim to substantive oversight, the
97 Grantham, supra note 96 at 759 (quoting Putting Patients First: Resolving Allocation
of Transplant Organs: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Env’t of the House
Comm. on Commerce and the Sen. Labor & Human Res. Comm., 105th Cong. 138 (1998)
[hereinafter Putting Patients First Hearing] (statement of Dr. Lawrence G. Hunsicker,
President, UNOS) (“[T]he proposed HHS [Rule] causes the transplant community great
concern.”)); Wisconsin, 2000 WL 34234002, at *5 (“An overwhelming majority of leading
experts within the transplant community condemned the final rule.”); WEIMER, supra note 4,
at 88–89 (“Rep. Michael Bilirakis introduced a bill to overturn the HHS Final Rule, stating in
the floor debate that medical experts and not Secretary Shalala know best when it comes to
transplant policy. [The bill] nullified the rule and prevented HHS from asserting final
authority over allocation policies. On April 4, 2000, it passed the House 275 to 147 . . . [but
w]ith the anticipated difficulty of resolving the large differences between the House and
Senate bills in conference committee, and the promised veto of any bill similar to the House
version by President Clinton, the 106th Congress ended without legislation on organ
allocation.” (parentheticals and internal quotation marks omitted)).
98 See generally Wisconsin, 2000 WL 34234002, at *5.
99 64 Fed. Reg. at 56,652.
100 See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174 (2007).
101 Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1104 (4th Cir. 1985) (citations
omitted).
102 64 Fed. Reg. at 56,659, codified as amended at 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(b)(2).
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provision cannot plausibly be argued to be anything but a “logical
outgrowth” of the originally noticed proposal.103 Nonetheless, even this
highly deferential doctrine does not tolerate rules that fall outside the
“statutory grant of authority.”104
B. Oversight Provision
So, the dispositive question is whether NOTA provides a “statutory
grant of authority” for the secretarial oversight provision. This Part
concludes that NOTA expressly authorizes secretarial review of the
Network’s procedures for developing allocation policies, but leaves no
room for her to overrule or revise their substance.
i. Procedural Oversight
NOTA authorizes the Secretary to “establish procedures for . . .
receiving . . . critical comments relating to the manner in which the
[OPTN] is carrying out the duties of the Network . . . ; and [for] the
consideration by the Secretary of such critical comments.”105 Since one
of the “duties of the Network” is “establish[ing] . . . medical criteria for
allocating organs,”106 the necessary inference is that NOTA empowers
the Secretary to consider the procedures by which the Network develops
allocation policies. Consistent with this inference, the Final Rule
authorizes the Secretary to “revise” those procedures or take “other action
as the Secretary determines appropriate.”107 In Murnaghan, Sarah’s
parents implicitly relied on this procedural oversight authority when they
claimed that the Under 12 Rule violated the Final Rule because it had
never been published in the Federal Register for public comment.108 But,
103 See BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 642 (1st Cir. 1979) (“Even
substantial changes in the original plan may be made so long as they are in character with the
original scheme and a logical outgrowth of the notice and comment already given. The
essential inquiry is whether the commenters have had a fair opportunity to present their views
on the contents of the final plan. We must be satisfied, in other words, that given a new
opportunity to comment, commenters would not have their first occasion to offer new and
different criticisms which the Agency might find convincing.” (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted)).
104 Long Island Care, 551 U.S. at 173–74.
105 42 U.S.C. § 274(c) (emphasis added).
106 Id. § 274(b)(2)(B).
107 See 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(d)(2)–(3).
108 Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 60. Separately, Sarah claimed that the “Secretary’s action
not to set aside the Under 12 Policy was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion . . . .”
Id. ¶¶ 13, 62 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2007) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful
and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary . . . .”)). However, a decision not to
employ enforcement authority is “committed to agency discretion by law.” See Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832, 835 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to take enforcement
action should be presumed immune from judicial review . . . .” (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2))).
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this claim was without merit.
The Final Rule states that allocation policies will be published in the
Federal Register in two circumstances (one mandatory, one
discretionary), neither of which were inapplicable with respect to the
Under 12 Rule. First, when a policy is “significant,” the Secretary
“will . . . publish [it] in the Federal Register for public comment.”109
Though the Murnaghans noted that “[n]one of the OPTN policies [have
been] published in the Federal Register,”110 they failed to demonstrate
that either the Under 12 Rule, or the overarching lung allocation policy,111
were “significant.”112 Without this affirmative showing, the mandatory
Federal Register publication provision does not apply. Second, the Final
Rule also states that the Secretary “may” publish “other proposed
policies” in the Federal Register.113 But, a plaintiff cannot establish a
cause of action by relying on a regulation that puts unqualified discretion
in the hands of an executive officer.114
ii. Substantive Oversight
In the alternative, the Murnaghans claimed that the Under 12 Rule
substantively violated the Final Rule.115 Here, the threshold question is
whether NOTA empowers the Secretary to overturn the Network’s
So, even assuming, for purposes of Sarah’s claim, that the Secretary actually had authority to
override allocation policies, the Department could demonstrate that the Network had, on the
Department’s behalf and within NOTA’s parameters, employed its “reasoned” expertise. See
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. And, since the “agency is far better equipped than the courts to
deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities,” a court should
not feel compelled to issue an order requiring the Department to set the Under 12 Rule aside.
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192–93 (1993) (finding unreviewable the agency’s
redistribution of “lump-sum appropriations,” which allow an agency to “adapt to changing
circumstances” (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831)). In the words of Justice Marshall in his
concurrence to Heckler: “[a]s long as the [Network] is choosing how to allocate finite . . .
[transplant organ] resources, [its] choice will be entitled to substantial deference, for the
choice among valid alternative . . . policies is precisely the sort of choice over which agencies
generally have been left substantial discretion by their enabling statutes. On the merits, then,
a decision . . . based on valid resource-allocation decisions will generally not be ‘arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” Cf. 470 U.S. at
842 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
109 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(b)(2) (emphasis added).
110 Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 24.
111 Policy
10: Allocation of Lungs, OPTN, (Oct 1, 2016), available at
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/1200/optn_policies.pdf.
112 This raises several questions: what criteria are used to determine whether an allocation
policy is “significant;” who determines those criteria; are those criteria objective or
subjective; should a court defer to the Department’s determination that a policy is
“significant,” and, if so, what form of deference is appropriate?
113 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(b)(2).
114 See supra note 108.
115 Complaint, supra note 20, ¶¶ 58–59.
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allocation policies when, in her estimation, those policies fail to conform
with the substantive requirements of the Final Rule. As noted, NOTA
authorizes the Secretary to “establish procedures for . . . receiving . . .
critical comments relating to the manner in which the [OPTN] is carrying
out the duties of the Network.”116 As a textual matter, this language
cannot be interpreted to provide the Secretary with substantive oversight
power.117 To the contrary, according to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, “the manner in which” a
duty is carried out is categorically a procedural issue.118
But, even assuming NOTA grants the Department discretion to
regulate the substance of Network policies, the question would
nevertheless remain: did the Final Rule supply grounds for the Secretary
to intrude in Sarah’s situation? The Murnaghans claimed that the Under
12 Rule “did not result in the equitable allocation of cadaveric organs” or
“give greatest consideration to allocating organs based on medical
urgency.”119 And, indeed, the Final rule requires that the Secretary
“assess [whether] proposed policies comply with . . . performance
indicators” that “measure how well each policy” is “achiev[ing] equitable
allocation of organs among patients” based on “sound medical
judgment.”120 Yet, fatally to Sarah’s claim, this authority to “assess,”
found in § 121.8, is not coupled with authority to override. While the
Secretary does have override authority over procedure under § 121.4,121
it would be unreasonable to graft that authority onto § 121.8, which
addresses substance.122
In summary, the Department was never required to publish the
Under 12 Rule in the Federal Register. And, even if NOTA gave the
Department leeway to promulgate regulations that would grant the
Secretary substantive oversight authority (which it does not), the
Department’s failure to incorporate that authority into the Final Rule left
Secretary Sebelius powerless to overturn the Under 12 Rule.
116

42 U.S.C. § 274(c) (emphasis added).
The legislative history also supports the position that substantive oversight is
precluded. See Grantham, supra note 96, at 759 n.58 (quoting Putting Patients First Hearing,
supra note 97, at 77 (statement of Sec’y Shalala) (“I reiterate that the Department does not
have a preconceived notion of any allocation policies. We are relying on the transplant
community to develop the policy.”)).
118 See Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Procedural rules . . .
alter the manner in which the parties present themselves or their viewpoints to the agency.”
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
119 See Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 58 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(a)(1)); id. ¶ 59 (citing 42
C.F.R. § 121.8(b)).
120 See 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(a)(1), (b), (c)(1), (f).
121 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
122 Cf. 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(a)–(h) (nowhere containing a secretarial override provision).
117
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V. ALLOCATION POLICIES
Though the Secretary lacked authority to rescind the Under 12 Rule,
that does not decide the issue whether the court could have struck it down
as “not in accordance with law.”123 This Part first argues that the
Network, though not subject to the requirements of the APA, employs a
parallel notice-and-comment system that nevertheless satisfies the APA’s
normative concerns. Second, it propounds a novel threshold test for
determining the applicability of Chevron deference to quasigovernmental entities, and contends that the Network satisfies that test.
Finally, it considers whether, when developing allocation policies, the
Network is a “state actor” subject to claims sounding in the Constitution.
A. Notice & Comment
The Murnaghans claimed that “[t]he Under 12 Rule is not in
accordance with law because [the lung allocation policy] was never
published in the Federal Register for public comment, in violation of 5
U.S.C. § 553(b).”124 This claim falters from the start: as a matter of law,
the Network is not subject to the APA. Moreover, as a normative matter,
the procedures that the Network utilizes to develop allocation policies
adequately address the same concerns that drive the APA’s notice-andcomment requirements.
i. Law
NOTA’s requirement that the OPTN operate a unique notice-andcomment system signals congressional intent not to subject the Network
to the APA.125 Congress controls whether an agency “is subject to
statutes that impose obligations or confer powers upon Government
entities, such as the [APA].”126 While HHS is certainly an “agency” that
must conform to § 553(b),127 Congress carved out the OPTN from the
APA’s informal-rulemaking obligations when it mandated that the OPTN
“establish [its own] public comment and hearing process . . . similar to

123

See Complaint, supra note 20, ¶¶ 54–60.
See Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 60.
125 Although, there is not much by way of judicial guidance in situations where, as here,
Congress has not expressly spoken on the issue. See O’Connell, supra note 63, at 917 (“The
ultimate result for all of these statutes is similar: there are no bright lines for boundary
organizations. This ambiguity derives from a dearth of decisions as well as inconsistency
among the tests used and decisions made. Administrative law scholars have said little about
this confusion.” (citation omitted)).
126 Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995).
127 The APA applies to any entity that is an “agency,” i.e., to any “authority of the
Government of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2007).
124
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the process required of government agencies.”128 And, indeed, the
Network has complied with its mandate. Its notice-and-comment system
is “similar to”—but distinct from—the APA.129 So, as a matter of law,
allocation policies are not subject to § 553(b).130
ii. Policy
But, even though the Network is not subject to the APA, the demand
for a similar notice-and-comment process demonstrates congressional
intent that the APA’s fundamental principles—transparency,
accountability, and participation131—also undergird allocation policy.
For this reason, it is important that the Network avoid two major pitfalls
of regulated resource allocation: ossification and capture.
Organ allocation is unlike most decision-making at the federal level,
which can result in the ossification of “winners” and “losers.” To take a
classic example, environmental protection groups want more stringent
emission standards; polluters want more relaxed ones. If the EPA
regulates less stringently, the polluters “win,” and the environmental
groups “lose.” While each individual organ allocated by the Network
similarly generates a “winner” (in the form of that organ’s recipient), the
next-in-line “loser” is likely to become the next “winner.” Now, there is
no perfectly “fair” way to allocate organs. But, unlike limited-resource
scenarios where static policies may ossify resource distribution,132 there

128 See Wisconsin v. Shalala, No. 00-C-155-C, 2000 WL 34234002, at *3 (W.D. Wis.
Nov. 22, 2000) (emphasis added).
129 Cf. Policy Notices, OPTN, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/policy-notices/
(last visited Nov. 7, 2016) (“Find summaries of all OPTN policy and bylaws changes
approved at board and executive committee meetings, including implementation dates and
any
actions
you
need
to
take.”);
Policy
Comment,
OPTN,
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/public-comment/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016)
(“The OPTN policy development process incorporates feedback on policy . . . before the
proposals go to the OPTN board of directors for approval. Public comment is an essential part
of the policy development process. All interested individuals are welcome to participate,
especially transplant candidates, who are most affected by policies. The OPTN welcomes
public comment on all open policy proposals. We consider every comment we receive about
a proposal before the OPTN board of directors votes on it.”).
130 If, to the contrary, the Network is subject to the APA, the Author posits that
anonymously donated organs are “public property” exempt from requirements of notice-andcomment rulemaking. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (“This section applies . . . except to the
extent that there is involved . . . a matter relating to . . . public property . . . .”) with 63 Fed.
Reg. at 16,300 (“Human organs that are given to save lives are a public resource . . . .”).
131 See generally Reeve T. Bull, Making the Administrative State “Safe for Democracy”:
A Theoretical and Practical Analysis of Citizen Participation in Agency Decisionmaking, 65
ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 627 (2013).
132 Cf. Craig A. Arnold, Resilient Cities and Adaptive Law, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 245, 257
(2014) (“[L]egal protections of private property rights . . . undermine the resilience and
functioning of ecosystems by . . . ossifying resource allocations . . . granted long ago.”).
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is generally no concern about permanent unfairness in the allocation
system,133 particularly since Network policy development is dynamic,
cyclical, and ongoing.134
Furthermore, by developing allocation policy blind to the identities
of the individual candidates that may receive organ offers, the Network
steers clear of any capture issue.135 Drawing on the same analogy, if the
EPA is considering a carbon cap on industrial CO2 emissions, the EPA
knows ex ante which players support and oppose the proposal and the
impact the proposal would have on those players.136 But, allocation
policy development is inherently devoid of capture in that they employ
general rules that are applied algorithmically to candidates in real time.137
In short, Network policymakers have no way of knowing how policy
changes will affect particular candidates.
So, while the Network is not subject to the APA’s notice-andcomment requirements, its dynamic and blind policy development
process is, as a general matter, transparent and procedurally fair.
However, a crucial question so far remains unanswered: does the content
of the Under 12 Rule fall within the range of acceptable choices
delineated by NOTA and the Final Rule?
B. Deference
The Murnaghans’ answer was, no, that the Under 12 Rule was
substantively “not in accordance with” NOTA or the Final Rule.138 Both
the Murnaghans and the court oversimplified this allegation, and thereby
failed to grapple with the subtle but important issue of whether the Under
12 Rule reflects the Network’s interpretation of NOTA or its
interpretation of the Final Rule. (The court must have presumed that it

133 Yet, if a particular individual is constantly a “loser,” as the Murnaghans alleged Sarah
was in the Under 12 Rule regime, then they may attempt to short-circuit the system through
indirect means like judicial review. See WEIMER, supra note 4, at 32.
134 See Making OPTN Policy, OPTN, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance
/policies/making-optn-policy/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) (providing “a brief look at the
process of an idea that transforms from proposal to transplant policy”).
135 Cf. Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1650
(2008) (“Certainly, any private entity that makes use of the expertise of interested—and often
self-interested—parties is subject to capture by those parties in a way that may distort its
public mission.”).
136 See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 21 (2010) (“To achieve either expert or nonpartisan decision
making, one must avoid undue industry influence, or ‘capture.’”).
137 See supra text accompanying notes 17–19.
138 See Complaint, supra note 20, ¶¶ 56–59.
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reflected the former because it found Chevron,139 but not Auer,140
deference to be a less-than-weighty “factor” in its decision.141)
Notwithstanding the court’s—likely unintentional—sidestepping of the
question,142 whether the Network’s gap-filling is done pursuant to a
statute versus a regulation matters.
If an allocation policy is an interpretation of NOTA (as this Part
argues is the case with respect to the Under 12 Rule), Chevron deference
may be appropriate.143 But, if an allocation policy reflects an
interpretation of the Final Rule, then it may be due Auer deference, a
doctrine that three Justices have questioned categorically. 144
i. Auer and Skidmore
Even if one assumes the continuing survival of the doctrine (which
is considered even more deferential than Chevron 145), Auer deference is
unavailable to Network policies because the Final Rule does no more than
“parrot” NOTA.146 The Final Rule stipulates that allocation policies must
139 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984) (courts are to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes where the
interpretation reasonably resolves the ambiguity).
140 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (restating that an agency’s interpretation
of its own regulations are “controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock
& Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))).
141 See supra text accompanying note 57. This Article sets aside the following question:
was it appropriate for the court to consider Chevron deference as a “factor” in its TRO
analysis? Cf. infra Part V (discussing the four factors relevant to a preliminary injunction
inquiry, none of which relate to Chevron deference).
142 Like the court, one commentator assumed this to be an issue of statutory interpretation
without further elaboration. Cf. Michelle DeVito, The Judge Put Me on the List: Judicial
Review and Organ Allocation Decisions, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 181, 196 (2014) (citation
omitted).
143 See infra Part V.B.2.
144 See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“I would . . . abandon[] Auer and apply[] the [APA] as written.
The agency is free to interpret its own regulations with or without notice and comment; but
courts will decide—with no deference to the agency—whether that interpretation is correct.”);
id. at 1225 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he entire line of precedent beginning
with Seminole Rock raises serious constitutional questions and should be reconsidered in an
appropriate case.”); see also id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“I await a case in which the validity of Seminole Rock may be explored through
full briefing and argument.”).
145 Hanah M. Volokh, The Anti-Parroting Canon, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 290, 291–92
(2011).
146 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257 (“An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret
its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation,
it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”). Were parroting not an issue
here, there would still be an issue of author identity: can Network policies receive Auer
deference as interpreting the Department’s Final Rule? Probably, yes. See John F. Manning,
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“result in the equitable allocation of cadaveric organs,” 147 while “giv[ing]
greatest consideration to allocating organs based on medical urgency.”148
In other words, the latter consideration (“medical urgency”) is but one
factor that the Network must incorporate into its overall “equitable”
allocation scheme. So, on reflection, the Final Rule’s insistence on
“equitable allocation” and “medical urgency” simply parrots NOTA’s
language, which requires allocation of organs “equitably among
transplant patients.”149 And, this is not even the only example of
parroting by the Department.
Like NOTA, which requires the Network to “improv[e] procedures
for organ . . . allocation . . . to . . . populations with limited access to
transportation,”150 the Final Rule instructs the Network to “reduce
inequities resulting from socioeconomic status.”151 At most, the
Department’s focus on this “socioeconomic” class of candidates is simply
a highlighting of one subcategory within—i.e., it neither adds to nor
subtracts from—NOTA’s broader category of “populations with limited
access to transportation.” Since the Final Rule provides no further targets
or goals for substantive Network policy development, the entirety of the
Department’s substantive regulatory instructions appears to parrot
NOTA. And, when parroting, an agency’s interpretation of a statute is
assessed with Skidmore deference, not Auer.152
Under Skidmore, an interpretation is entitled to respect “proportional
to its ‘power to persuade.’”153 While the application of the Under 12 Rule
may seem normatively unfair out of context,154 there is no reason to
suspect that the rule itself is unpersuasive: the lung allocation system is
“highly detailed,”155 and the Network “benefit[ted]” from the
“specialized experience” of the transplant community as it answered “the
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 696 n.104 (1996) (“Authorship is not an essential predicate to
deference under [Auer]. Rather, the Court has relied on the Chevron rationale to defer to an
agency’s interpretation of regulations that the agency did not adopt.” (citing, e.g., BethEnergy,
501 U.S. at 696–97 (finding judicial deference due to Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of
regulations promulgated by Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, where congressional
delegation “entails the authority to interpret HEW’s regulations and the discretion to
promulgate interim regulations based on a reasonable interpretation thereof”))).
147 Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 58 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(a)(1)).
148 Id. ¶ 59 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(b)).
149 See 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(D).
150 See id. § 274(b)(2)(N).
151 See 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(a)(3).
152 See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 268–69.
153 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
154 Cf. HHS Hearing, supra note 84.
155 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 29–32.
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subtle questions” about pediatric lung transplantation.156 That said, a
court should only rely on Skidmore if it has first determined that the
policy reflected an interpretation of the Final Rule.
ii. Chevron
In the alternative, a court could find that the Under 12 Rule interprets
NOTA, which would raise the question whether the policy is due Chevron
deference.
The Murnaghan court assumed the applicability of
Chevron,157 but failed to note, inter alia, that the defendant (the
Department) was not, in fact, the author of the policy at issue.158
a. Threshold
If Chevron is going to be applied to a policy like the Under 12 Rule,
a court should understand why that is so before deferring to a quasigovernmental entity’s interpretation of its organic statute. Here, the two
norms that normally support a finding of Chevron deference—namely,
expertise and political accountability159—intersect in such an unusual
way that, perhaps, political accountability need not be demonstrated at
all.160 Arguably, since the only interests implicated by allocation policies
are those of the candidates, and since Network policies utilize “medical
criteria” to allocate organs,161 political accountability ought to be
irrelevant.162 Consider the following test: where organizational expertise
156

See supra text accompanying notes 75 & 99.
See supra text accompanying note 57.
158 It may be that this is a distinction without a difference, since courts may conclude that
an agency has given its sub-agency a “stamp of approval” without “digging” deeply into
“where an interpretation originated, or whether the agency was truly the primary interpreter
involved.” Aaron R. Cooper, Sidestepping Chevron: Reframing Agency Deference for an Era
of Private Governance, 99 GEO. L.J. 1431, 1450–51 (2011) (parenthetical omitted) (citing
David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201,
204, 234–35 (2001)).
159 O’Connell, supra note 63, at 923 (“[D]eference doctrines draw largely from the
perceived institutional characteristics of agencies, notably their accountability and
expertise—at least relative to the courts.”).
160 But cf. Kimberly N. Brown, “We the People,” Constitutional Accountability, and
Outsourcing Government, 88 IND. L.J. 1347, 1391 (“Not all government contracts raise
accountability issues of constitutional dimension. . . . [A] contract should be initially
scrutinized for constitutional accountability if one of two triggers exist: First, a contract
delegates to private parties executive power under the Constitution’s express terms, or,
second, a contract affords to a private party the ability to exercise enforcement power in a
manner that could lead to a realistic risk of interference with civil liberties.”).
161 See 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
162 If, as the Murnaghan court presumed, HHS had directly developed the Under 12 Rule,
then this analysis would be simpler: as a traditional cabinet department, Chevron’s
accountability norm would certainly have been triggered, see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66
(“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, . . .”) and
157
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is extraordinary, where Congress justifiably entrusts rulemaking to that
expertise, and where the interests implicated by the resulting policies are
those of a narrowly defined population, political accountability need not
be demonstrated because its value in the Chevron calculus approaches
zero.
Were it instead necessary to demonstrate political accountability in
the context of allocation policies, there would be three potentially
insurmountable obstacles to the application of Chevron deference.163
First, the substantive secretarial oversight provision of the Final Rule is
an invalid interpretation of NOTA,164 so, it cannot be relied upon to
establish political accountability as a matter of law. Second, since no
Secretary has ever employed the procedural secretarial oversight
provision (nor affirmatively approved an allocation policy), no Network
policy has ever been generated in a politically accountable atmosphere as
a matter of fact.165 Third, there is no statutory authority granting the
President or the Secretary the power to remove any member of the OPTN/
UNOS Board.166
satisfied since the Secretary serves at the pleasure of the President, subject to removal without
cause. Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. (PCAOB), 561 U.S. 477,
483 (2010) (“Since 1789, the Constitution has been understood to empower the President to
keep these officers accountable—by removing them from office, if necessary.” (citing Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926))).
163 Cf. Brown, supra note 160, at 1351 (“Inevitably, democratic accountability is
compromised with the practice of government outsourcing, which occurs when the
government contracts with private parties to provide goods or services for which the
government is responsible.”).
164 See supra Part IV.B.2.
165 See supra Part IV.B.1.
166 See PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 496 (“Neither the President, nor anyone directly responsible
to him . . . has full control over the Board. The President is stripped of the power our
precedents have preserved, and his ability to execute the laws—by holding his subordinates
accountable for their conduct—is impaired.”). The PCAOB problem may be resolved by the
possibility that the President could order termination of the OPTN/UNOS contract. See
Kimberly N. Brown, Government by Contract and the Structural Constitution, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 491, 521 (2011). But, if the President were to order termination, the order
would first go through the Secretary, who would then have to command HRSA’s contracting
officer (“CO”) to terminate the contract with UNOS. And, that Administrator would be
obliged to independently investigate before the contract could be terminated for the
“convenience” of the Government. See 48 C.F.R. § 49.101(b) (2015) (“The contracting officer
shall terminate contracts . . . only when it is in the Government’s interest.”); see also
TigerSwan, Inc. v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 447, 452 (2014) (“Without question, a CO is
granted a great deal of discretion in determining whether it is in the government’s best interest
to terminate a contract for convenience. However, while a CO is afforded wide discretion,
[s]he is still responsible for making an independent decision with regard to a contract.”
(citation omitted)). Thus, even assuming contract termination makes the Network
accountable for purposes of Chevron, see Brown, supra note 160, at 1403 (“To be sure, there
are a number of hurdles that a constitutional accountability doctrine presents. The precise
details of what must be included in federal contracts to satisfy an accountability doctrine are
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To summarize, if a court found itself unwilling to compromise with
respect to the necessity of the political accountability norm, then, for the
reasons discussed above, it likely would have to deny Chevron deference
to the Network for three reasons: (1) the Secretary has no power over the
substance of the Network’s policies; (2) even if she did, she has
essentially waived it; and, (3) neither she nor the President can coerce the
Network’s leadership for lack of direct removability. What follows
assumes that a court has concluded that the Network’s expertise is
sufficient to outweigh the dearth of political accountability, and therefore
that it is necessary to embark upon a Chevron analysis.167
b. Step One
In the case of the Under 12 Rule, the question at Chevron’s first step
is whether NOTA is “unambiguous[]”168 in its use of the term “equitably”
and the phrase “address the unique health care needs of children.”169 Or,
more precisely, “employing traditional tools of statutory construction,”170
has Congress “directly spoken to the precise question at issue:”171
namely, how should pediatric candidates—or, at a lower level of
generalization, how should pediatric lung candidates—be treated when
compared with adult candidates in the context of adult-donor offers?
To answer this question, one begins by looking at NOTA’s text. The
Network’s allocation policies must not only “distribut[e] organs
equitably among transplant patients,”172 but must also “address the
unique health care needs of children.”173 Without further clarity
elsewhere in the statute, NOTA is ambiguous as to how the Network

not immediately apparent and would have to be developed through litigation or legislation,
which takes time.”), it does not appear the President has direct control over the Network Board
through termination and, therefore, the Network cannot avoid the PCAOB problem.
167 Some commentators have expressed categorical resistance to the idea of granting
Chevron deference to a private entity. See, e.g., A. Cooper, supra note 158, at 1460 (citation
omitted) (“Structural aspects of privatization suggest that private delegation increases the
likelihood that the decision-making values embodied in both Chevron and the Constitution
will be undermined: values such as transparency, accountability, fairness, and deliberation
may all be compromised.”). Others would apply Chevron deference, at least in this instance.
See, e.g., DeVito, supra note 142, at 197; Jocelyn Cooper, Dissecting the Heart of Organ
Allocation Policy: Evaluating the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s Grant of Life in
Murnaghan v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 59 VILL. L. REV. 269, 299
(2014).
168 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
169 See supra text accompanying note 22.
170 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
171 Id. at 842.
172 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(D).
173 Id. § 274(b)(2)(M).
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should treat children vis-à-vis adults.174 Assuming legislative history
may not be considered,175 it seems the Under 12 Rule easily clears
Chevron’s first step because it falls within the ambiguity gap established
by NOTA—i.e., it demonstrably attempts to ensure “equitabl[e]” organ
allocation while also “address[ing] the unique . . . needs” that attend to
children who require lung transplants. Before moving on to Chevron’s
second step, however, a court must engage in the two-part Mead
inquiry.176
c. Mead
The first prong of Mead asks whether Congress delegated authority
to make rules “carrying the force of law,” holding that such a delegation
“may be shown . . . by an agency’s power to engage in . . . notice-andcomment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable
congressional intent.”177 So, here, the question is whether the Network’s
internal notice-and-comment system is “comparable” to the APA noticeand-comment system.178 NOTA’s text illustrates a striking similarity:
174 Here, ambiguity is readily apparent due to the potential conflict in allocating
“equitably,” while still prioritizing children. In these sorts of circumstances, the Supreme
Court “permit[s] the Executive to make trade-offs between competing policy goals.” See
American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. at 1251 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing, e.g.,
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 423–26 (1944) (approving authorization for
agency to set prices of commodities at levels that “will effectuate the [sometimes conflicting]
purposes of th[e] Act”) and Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 686–87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (“It is difficult to imagine a more
obvious example of Congress simply avoiding a choice which was both fundamental for
purposes of the statute and yet politically so divisive that the necessary decision or
compromise was difficult, if not impossible, to hammer out in the legislative forge.”)).
175 Cf. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 406–07 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“One line of cases
instructs us to cease our inquiry and give effect to the statute’s unambiguous language.
Another tells us to wade into the legislative history in the hope of glimpsing ‘new light on
congressional intent.’ . . . [O]ur decision about which path to travel implicates substantial
theoretical questions of statutory interpretation, . . .” (citations omitted)), reh’g en banc
granted, judgment vacated, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014). If a
court decides to consider legislative history at Step One, it ought to take note of two key facts.
First, NOTA originally did not refer to the “unique health care needs of children;” and the
bills, committee reports, and debates surrounding NOTA in the House and Senate fail to make
reference to “child” or “children,” outside a general plea to increase the donor pool. See, e.g.,
130 Cong. Rec. 29,982 (Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy) (“This bill is a small
but very important step toward assisting children and adults dying tragically and unnecessarily
because of the lack of needed organs.”). Second, NOTA was amended by the Children’s
Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, 114 Stat. 1101 (2000), to include § 274(b)(2)(M),
which calls for the OPTN to be attentive to the “unique health care needs of children[.]”.
176 Cf. O’Connell, supra note 63, at 925 (“To the extent that boundary organizations use
a wider range of tools to make decisions than the rulemaking and adjudication categories
entrenched in the APA, they may have a harder time qualifying for deference under Mead.”).
177 533 U.S. at 227.
178 Compare supra note 129, with 5 U.S.C. § 553.
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“[t]he [OPTN] shall . . . provide to members of the public an opportunity
to comment with respect to [allocation] criteria.”179 It is difficult to
imagine that a court would not find such language “comparable” to
language directing an agency to utilize APA rulemaking procedures.
Indeed, in an opinion handed down seven months before Mead (but
seemingly prophetic of its holding), one federal district court found that,
yes, the language of NOTA indicates the Network’s notice-and-comment
system was meant to act in a manner “similar to” informal rulemaking
under the APA.180
What remains is to determine whether the Under 12 Rule, in
particular, also satisfies Mead’s second prong, which asks whether the
policy for which deference is sought was “promulgated in the exercise of
[the Network’s notice-and-comment] authority.”181 It was: the Under 12
Rule was made part of the lung allocation policy via the Network’s
notice-and-comment system.182 Having now answered both Mead
questions in the affirmative, it is appropriate to move on to Chevron’s
second step.
d. Step Two
Here, courts uphold an interpretation of a statute if that interpretation
is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”183 Since
Chevron’s second step is dramatically more deferential than Skidmore,
and since it is already evident that the Network’s allocation policies have
the Skidmore-satisfying “power to persuade,”184 the Under 12 Rule would

179

42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(B).
See Wisconsin, 2000 WL 34234002, at *3.
181 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. One commentator has concluded that the Network’s
allocation policies carry the “force of law” and are due Chevron deference, in part, because
the notice-and-comment procedures described in the Department’s Final Rule (requiring
allocation policies to be submitted to the Secretary and published in the Federal Register for
comment) are “more suggestive of rulemaking procedures than the creation of non-binding
policy statements.” DeVito, supra note 142, at 197 (citing Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529
U.S. 576, 586–89 (2000)). This argument, however, ignores a key fact: allocation policies
have never been promulgated pursuant to the Final Rule; indeed, Sarah Murnaghan’s parents
contended that this failure to abide by federal regulations was a reason to invalidate the Under
12 Rule. See supra text accompanying note 108. Moreover, were the Under 12 Rule examined
through the procedural lens of the Final Rule (as the commentator seems to suggest it should
be), then the Under 12 Rule necessarily would be invalid since it was not “promulgated in the
exercise of [the Final Rule’s] authority.” See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.
182 Roberts, supra note 20. See generally supra note 129.
183 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron
Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 599 (2009) (“Subsequent courts and commentators
have treated Step Two as a requirement that the agency’s statutory interpretation be
‘reasonable.’”).
184 See supra notes 153–156 and accompanying text.
180
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undoubtedly clear Chevron’s second step.185 In short, assuming that the
Network’s allocation policies generally may be subject to Chevron
deference, the Under 12 Rule specifically would satisfy both steps of
Chevron and, therefore, should be immune from judicial intervention as
a matter of administrative law.
C. State Action
But, even Chevron deference cannot save a policy that is
unconstitutional.186 In Murnaghan, Sarah’s parents claimed that the
Under 12 Rule violated Sarah’s Due Process and Equal Protection
rights.187 However, as a prerequisite to claiming that an allocation policy
violates one’s constitutional rights, the plaintiff must also allege that the
promulgation and/or application of the policy is state action.188 The
Murnaghans avoided this issue altogether by suing the Department. But,
the Department is not the entity responsible for allocation policies.189
185 See, e.g., Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States, 522 F.3d 937, 942
(9th Cir. 2008) (where a quasi-governmental regulation survives the “less stringent Skidmore
analysis,” there is no need to conduct Mead or Chevron Step Two analyses). This Part does
not analyze the substance of the Under 12 Rule to determine whether it would survive
Chevron’s second step as this would involve extensive analysis of the Network’s scientific
and medical judgments. Helpfully, one commentator has condensed many of the relevant
considerations in support of her position that Chevron deference would be appropriate. See
DeVito, supra note 142, at 198–200.
186 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 914
(2001) (“Because the Constitution is a form of law superior to a mere statute, . . . there can be
no doubt that Chevron deference must give way when the agency’s policy, although consistent
with the statute and otherwise permissible in light of the statutory language and purpose,
impinges upon principles that the Court has discerned in the Constitution.” (citing Dickerson
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (“Congress may not legislatively supersede our
decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.”))).
187 Complaint, supra note 20, ¶¶ 54–55.
Whether this argument would have been
successful on the merits is beyond the scope of this Article. But, the intersection of allocation
rules and the Constitution has received attention in the literature. See, e.g., O’Brien, supra
note 28, at 128–33 (analyzing the Network’s lung allocation policy in the context of equal
protection and concluding that it “passes constitutional muster”); Benjamin Mintz, Analyzing
the OPTN Under the State Action Doctrine—Can UNOS’s Organ Allocation Survive Strict
Scrutiny?, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 339, 376–96 (noting a “racially discriminatory
effect that results from the factoring of antigen matching in [kidney] allocation decisions,”
and arguing that such an “allocation system may not be able to survive equal protection strict
scrutiny analysis”).
188 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)
(“Our cases try to plot a line between state action subject to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny
and private conduct (however exceptionable) that is not.” (citations omitted)); see U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.”); see also id. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
189 Query whether the Department was a proper defendant to this lawsuit in the first
instance. Cf. supra note 146 (discussing the author identity issue). Although the Network
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So, the Murnaghan court should have addressed whether, when
promulgating allocation policy, the Network—a quasi-governmental
entity—is engaging in state action such that it is subject to claims of
constitutional violations. Critically, only a court may answer this
question.
While Congress has discretion to impose statutory
requirements on quasi-governmental entities—e.g., whether to subject
them to FOIA190—Congress receives no deference in the determination
immediately complied with the Murnaghan court’s TRO, it is arguable that it need not have
done so, since the Network was not itself a named party in Sarah’s complaint. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 65(d)(2)(A). It is more likely, though, that the Network was legally bound to obey the
order as an “agent” or “servant” of the Department, see id. 65(d)(2)(B), since the Network is
under contract with HRSA. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
190 The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) allows any individual to request federal
agency records. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2014). HHS, CMS, and HRSA are subject
to FOIA and maintain offices to respond to requests. See Freedom of Information and Privacy
Acts Division, HHS, http://www.hhs.gov/foia/contacts/index
.html/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). Private entities, on the other hand, are not generally subject
to FOIA, Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 179–80 (1980), as they do not meet FOIA’s
definition of “agencies.” Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1). But, exceptions do exist. See, e.g., Moye,
O’Brien, O’Rourke, Hogan & Pickert v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 376 F.3d 1270, 1277 n.5
(11th Cir. 2004) (concluding that Amtrak is subject to FOIA though not a federal agency
(citing 49 U.S.C. § 24301(e) (2016) (“[FOIA] applies to Amtrak for any fiscal year in which
Amtrak receives a Federal subsidy.”))). A two-pronged test determines whether the subject
of a FOIA request is an “agency record”: first, an agency must “‘either create or obtain’” the
record; second, “the agency must be in control of the requested materials at the time the FOIA
request is made.” Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1989) (citations
omitted). And, the “data generated by a privately controlled organization which has received
grant funds from an agency, but which data has not at any time been obtained by the agency,
are not ‘agency records’ accessible under the FOIA,” even when the agency subjects the
private entity to “some supervision.” Forsham, 445 U.S. at 173, 176–78 (parenthetical
omitted) (finding that a private research group’s data were not agency records despite
agency’s “right of access to the data” because the agency “ha[d] not exercised its right . . . to
obtain permanent custody of the data”). The OPTN/UNOS, as its moniker would suggest,
has a dual nature: the OPTN is a shell quasi-governmental agency operated by UNOS, an
entirely private non-profit entity that existed prior to—and wholly independent of—NOTA.
See supra Part I. OPOs generate allocation lists in compliance with the policies of UNOS,
which then stores and maintains those lists. But, NOTA anticipates that the OPTN will
continue to maintain the national organ-matching registry even if UNOS ceases to act as its
operator. See Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional
Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV.
62, 96 n.108 (1990) (“HHS . . . may select a different private delegate to discharge those
functions currently undertaken by UNOS.”). This in mind, the OPTN—and not UNOS—
must be the legal holder of allocation lists; otherwise, UNOS could (arguably) refuse to
provide them to any successor-operator. FOIA applies to the OPTN since it is a federal
governmental agency, even if only a shell. So, FOIA applies to the records produced by
UNOS in its role as OPTN operator. That said, neither UNOS nor the OPTN have a FOIA
office. So, as an experiment to determine whether UNOS records can actually be obtained,
the Author submitted FOIA requests to HHS, HRSA, and CMS, for the lung allocation lists
whence Sarah Murnaghan received her two bilateral lung transplants. HHS immediately
responded that it was not the holder of UNOS records, and forwarded the request to HRSA.
See Letter from HHS FOIA Office to Author (Dec. 12, 2014) (on file with author). CMS
attempted to locate the lists and—upon realizing that it did not hold them—also forwarded
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of whether such an entity is a state actor for constitutional purposes.191
The following is an analysis of the Network under three of the
Court’s tests for determining whether a nominally private entity is
engaging in state action:192 entwinement, control, and public function.193
the request to HRSA. See Letter from Hugh Gilmore, Director, CMS FOIA Office, to Author
(Feb. 23, 2015) (on file with author). HRSA flatly denied the request. See Letter from
Thomas Flavin, Freedom of Information Officer, HRSA FOIA Office, to Author (March 23,
2015) (on file with author) (“[T]he lung allocation lists . . . are exempt under FOIA Exemption
(b)(6), which protects against the release of information about individuals in . . . medical
files . . . when the disclosure of such information would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). It may be inferred from
this response that HRSA perceives the Network’s allocation lists to be agency records subject
to FOIA requests. Otherwise, it seems more likely that HRSA would have responded as HHS
and CMS did: by simply dodging the request, rather than citing to a substantive FOIA
exemption. Notwithstanding the implication, the Author appealed HRSA’s determination,
arguing that Exemption (b)(6) does not apply to redacted copies of the allocation lists. See
Letter from Author to Deputy Chief FOIA Officer, Office of the HHS Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs (April 9, 2015) (on file with author). HHS affirmed HRSA’s decision to deny
disclosure arguing, first, that FOIA does not demand disclosure for lack of public interest;
and, second, that the records themselves “are found in a Privacy Act System of Records
(SORN-09-15-0055), Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN)/Scientific
Registry of Transplant Recipients (STR) Data System,” access to which is limited by the
Privacy Act. See Letter from Catherine Teti, Deputy Agency Chief FOIA Officer, Office of
the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, to Author (Aug. 19, 2015) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a
and 74 Fed. Reg. 57,184, 57,184–86 (Nov. 4, 2009)). In conclusion, HHS appears to view
OPTN/UNOS allocation lists as “agency record[s],” at least for purposes of FOIA. Cf. Tax
Analysts, 492 U.S. at 144–45.
191 See American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. at 1231 (“Congressional pronouncements, though
instructive as to matters within Congress’ authority to address, are not dispositive of . . . status
as a governmental entity for purposes of separation of powers analysis under the
Constitution.” (citation omitted)); see also Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 296 (“[T]he
character of a legal entity is determined neither by its expressly private characterization in
statutory law, nor by the failure of the law to acknowledge the entity’s inseparability from
recognized government officials or agencies.” (citing Lebron, 513 U.S. at 399 (“We hold that
where, as here, the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of
governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of
the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the
First Amendment.”))).
192 Cf. Gross, supra note 2, at 238–39 (“Although courts have not had to confront the state
actor problem with respect to UNOS, it is academically interesting because it plays on an
ambiguity that has persisted since NOTA’s enactment: how to characterize the mix of
‘private’ and ‘governmental’ features constituting the OPTN.”).
193
This Part does not engage in four other state action tests for various reasons. See
generally Julie K. Brown, Less is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L.
REV. 561, 581 (2008) (citations omitted) (“The state action doctrine is slowly descending into
utter confusion, where private parties remain unaware of what conduct subjects them to
Constitutional restrictions, and courts are unclear as to the appropriate state action standard.”).
First, the Court has not used the state compulsion test for over half a century. Id. at 567 n.60
(citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)). Second, the joint
participation test “applies in situations where the state so closely encourages a party’s activity
that the private actor is said to be ‘cloaked with the authority of the state,’” id. at 567 (citation
omitted), which is a situation utterly dissimilar from the relationship between the Department
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The tests do not formalistically review the organic statutes of quasigovernmental entities;194 rather, each is highly fact-specific and must be
applied on a case-by-case basis.195
i. Entwinement
This fact-specific inquiry is particularly daunting when trying to
predict whether a court would find state action under the entwinement
test. Generally, where there is a “pervasive entwinement of [government]
officials in the structure of [a nominally private] association,” that
“association’s regulatory activity may and should be treated as state
action . . . .”196 In Brentwood Academy, the Court found state action
where a state-wide not-for-profit interscholastic athletic association,
which included most of the state’s public schools,197 acted through those
schools’ representatives to regulate athletics “in lieu of the State Board
of Education’s exercise of its own authority.”198
Like in Brentwood Academy, where the voting membership of the
association’s rulemaking and administrative arms consisted of
representatives—e.g., principals—from the member schools,199 the
OPTN/UNOS Board is primarily comprised of transplant surgeons
representing the Network’s affiliated transplant centers.200 But, unlike
and the Network. Third, the symbiotic relationship test is “closely related to”—but “more
unstructured than”—a fourth test, the nexus test, id., which has already received consideration
in the literature as applied to the Network: while “[t]he facts underlying the OPTN scheme
legitimate an argument of a sufficient nexus between the OPTN and the government,” it is
extremely challenging to predict how the Supreme Court would categorize the relationship
“because the determination of a sufficient nexus classifying a private entity as a state actor is
heavily fact-driven.” Mintz, supra note 187, at 373 (“[D]espite the presence of a relatively
significant nexus,” the Court concluded that the United States Olympic Committee was not a
state actor; hence “the Court is unlikely to find the OPTN a state actor on the nexus theory
since the evidence of a nexus was stronger with respect to the USOC than it is with respect to
the OPTN.” (citing S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542–
47 (1987))).
194 See Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 301 n.4 (“[I]f formalism were the sine qua non
of state action, the doctrine would vanish owing to the ease and inevitability of its evasion,
and for just that reason formalism has never been controlling.”).
195 Id. at 295–96 (“[N]o one fact can function as a necessary condition across the board
for finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient, for there may be
some countervailing reason against attributing activity to the government.”); Burton, 365 U.S.
at 722 (“Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement
of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.”).
196 Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 291.
197 Id. at 299–300 (“Only the 16% minority of private school memberships prevents this
entwinement of the Association and the public school system from being total and their
identities totally indistinguishable.”).
198 Id. at 291.
199 See id at 299–300.
200 See Board of Directors, OPTN, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members/board-of-
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the committee members in Brentwood Academy, who were employees of
the very state (Tennessee) that the Court found the association to be
“entwine[d]” with,201 the members of the Network committees are
citizens of various states and primarily employees of geographically
diverse private hospitals, public hospitals, OPOs, and histocompatibility
laboratories.202 Moreover, none of the voting members of its Board or
committees are employees of the Federal Government.
Also, in Brentwood Academy, the Tennessee State Board of
Education had historically and expressly designated the association as
“‘the organization to supervise and regulate [interscholastic] athletic
activities . . . .’”203 Likewise, HHS has consistently designated UNOS to
operate the OPTN.204 Finally, as in Brentwood Academy, where State
Board of Education members were “assigned ex officio to serve as
members of the [association’s rulemaking and administrative arms],”205
the HHS Division of Transplantation is represented by ex officio
members on the Network Board and on many Network committees.206
Overall, it is an onerous—perhaps impossible—task to anticipate
whether a court would find entwinement after weighing these various
directors/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
201 Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 300.
202 See Committees, OPTN, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members/committees/
committee-q-a/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). Worth noting, as an aside, is the Ethics
Committee: its composition mirrors almost exactly the hypothetical “Medical Commission”
Justice Scalia sketched in a prescient dissent. Compare Ethics Committee, OPTN,
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members/committees/ethics-committee/ (last visited Nov. 7,
2016) (listing the following as members (among others): six transplant centers M.D.’s; two
OPO representatives; and three members of the general public, including Georgetown
University medical ethicist Robert Veatch, Ph.D.) and Robert Veatch, Ph.D., KENNEDY
INSTITUTE OF ETHICS, https://kennedyinstitute.georgetown
.edu/people/robert-veatch/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) (“One of the pioneers of contemporary
medical ethics, Dr. Veatch served as an ethics consultant in the early legal case of [a] woman
whose parents won the right to forgo life-support . . . .”) with Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 422
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If rulemaking can be entirely unrelated to the exercise of judicial or
executive powers, I foresee all manner of ‘expert’ bodies, insulated from the political process,
to which Congress will delegate various portions of its lawmaking responsibility. How
tempting to create an expert Medical Commission (mostly M.D.’s, with perhaps a few Ph.D.’s
in moral philosophy) to dispose of such thorny, ‘now-in’ political issues as the withholding
of life-support systems . . . .”).
203 Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 292 (citation omitted).
204 See Wisconsin, 2000 WL 34234002, at *2.
205 Id. at 300.
206 See, e.g., Board of Directors, OPTN, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members
/board-of-directors/ (listing Melissa Greenwald (Director, HRSA Division of
Transplantation) as ex officio member) (last visited Nov. 26, 2016); Data Advisory
Committee, OPTN, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members/committees/data-advisorycommittee/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2016) (listing its membership to include Monica Lin and
Christopher J. McLaughlin (Division of Transplantation, HHS, Ex Officio-Non Voting)).
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facts. All considered, it is unclear which way the entwinement analysis
cuts, whereas it is clear the Network is not under control of the
Government.
ii. Control
Though decided in substantively distinct constitutional contexts,
Livestock Marketing (First Amendment207) and American Railroads
(separation of powers208) are leading examples of the factual and legal
circumstances in which a court may find that the Federal Government
controls a nominally private entity, thus opening the door to claims that
the entity has violated the Constitution.209 While the quasi-governmental
entities in those cases share some features with the Network, 210 key
distinctions evidence that the latter is not under the Government’s
control. In Livestock Marketing, the Court found that the Agriculture
Secretary intimately and consistently “exercise[d]” authority over the
Beef Committee’s ultimate advertising message, and therefore held that
the “message of the promotional campaigns [was] effectively controlled

See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005).
See American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. at 1228.
209 Cf. Kevin R. Kosar, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30533, THE QUASI GOVERNMENT:
HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS WITH BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR LEGAL
CHARACTERISTICS 2 (2011) (organizing governmental and quasi-governmental entities on a
linear spectrum based on “their relationship to the executive branch (and Congress)” as a
matter of control). Closest to the government are “highly ‘political’” quasi-official
institutions that are “subject to pressures not dissimilar to th[ose] encountered by regular
executive agencies.” Id. at 6. Farthest from the government are nonprofit organizations
“honorific[ally]” chartered by Congress for “patriotic, charitable, historical, or educational
purpose[s],” without conferral of governmental power or benefits. Id. at 22–23; see, e.g.,
Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. at 542–43 (“The [United States Olympic Committee] is a
‘private corporation established under Federal law.’” (citation omitted)).
210 For example, like in Livestock Marketing, where the “Beef Committee”—charged
with developing generic beef advertisements, 7 U.S.C. § 2904(1), (4)(A)–(B) (2010)—was
selected by a board of private geographically representative cattle producers and importers, 7
C.F.R. § 1260.141 (2016), the Network’s Board and committees are also geographically
representative and composed of private experts moonlighting as policymakers. See supra text
accompanying note 202. Furthermore, both Amtrak and the Network have large-scale publicbenefit goals: Amtrak must “provide efficient and effective intercity passenger rail mobility,”
49 U.S.C. § 24101(b), and reduce fares for the disabled and elderly, id. § 24307(a); the
Network must distribute “organs equitably among transplant patients,” 42 U.S.C.
§ 274(b)(2)(D), and “address the unique health care needs of children.” Id. § 274(b)(2)(M).
And, both are recipients of significant federal financial support. Compare American
Railroads, 135 S. Ct. at 1232 (“In its first 43 years of operation, Amtrak has received more
than $41 billion in federal subsidies. In recent years these subsidies have exceeded $1 billion
annually.” (citation omitted)) with Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committees,
HRSA, at 14, http://www.hrsa.gov/about/budget/budgetjustification2015.pdf/ (last visited
Nov. 7, 2016) (HRSA received more than $23M per annum in 2013 and 2014 for
transplantation).
207
208
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by the Federal Government itself.”211 Likewise, in American Railroads,
the Court found the political branches “control[led] Amtrak’s . . . Board
of Directors [and] exercise[d] substantial, statutorily mandated
supervision over Amtrak’s priorities and operations,” and thus concluded
that Amtrak was a “governmental entity for purposes of separation of
powers analysis under the Constitution.”212
The record here demonstrates the antithesis. The HHS Secretary has
never directed the Network to develop any particular policy (nor has she
even adopted one promulgated by the Network213), and the Network
Board’s members are private actors who have never been subjected to
active Executive oversight (nor are those members subject to removal214).
And, yet, as unlikely as it would be for a court to find on these facts that
the Government controls the Network to the extent that it is subject to
constitutional claims, there is one more state action test to consider.
iii. Public Function
In order for a private entity to engage in state action under the public
function test, the “function performed [must have] been ‘traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the State.’”215 Two commentators have
suggested that the Network does not perform a public function because
“[t]he provision of general medical care is not a traditional public
function,”216 and because “the private sector has traditionally been
Livestock Marketing, 544 U.S. at 560–61 (“[T]he record demonstrates that the
Secretary exercises final approval authority over every word used in every promotional
campaign. All proposed promotional messages are reviewed by Department officials both for
substance and for wording, and some proposals are rejected or rewritten by the Department.
Nor is the Secretary’s role limited to final approval or rejection: Officials of the Department
also attend and participate in the open meetings at which proposals are developed.” (citations
omitted)).
212 American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. at 1231. Notably, the Court held so despite express
statutory language stating that Amtrak “is not a department, agency or instrumentality of the
United States Government.” Id. at 1233 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
213 Cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 251 (1977) (“Had the State itself
adopted the procedures it approved for the private utility, it would have been subject to the
full constraints of the Constitution.”).
214 Contra American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. at 1231 (“[A]ll appointed Board members are
removable by the President without cause.” (citation omitted)); Livestock Marketing, 544 U.S.
at 560 (“All members of the [Beef] Committee are subject to removal by the Secretary.”
(citation and emphasis omitted)).
215 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)); contra, e.g., Olympic Committee,
483 U.S. at 544–45 (“The [Amateur Sports] Act merely authorized the [Olympic Committee]
to coordinate activities that always have been performed by private entities. Neither the
conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has been a traditional governmental
function.”).
216 Mintz, supra note 187, at 367 (citing, e.g., Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 523 F.2d 75,
211
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responsible for the procurement and transplantation of organs.” 217 When
considered at a low level of generality, their argument is well taken.
But, at a slightly higher level of generality, the Network serves a
different function: it operates to allocate a limited public resource. 218 And
this is a function traditionally reserved to the Government.219 So, when
applying the public function test, the fact that the Network’s functions
were previously managed by purely private organizations may be of less
importance than the “stark fact . . . that there are not enough organs to go
around.”220 Clearly though, a plaintiff-candidate’s success on a public
function theory would depend heavily on the court’s tolerance of highlevel generality.221
iv. Normative Judgment
Regardless of the test employed, however, courts are granted
considerable discretion to insert their own “normative judgment” when
deciding state-action inquiries: “[e]ven facts that suffice to show public
action (or, standing alone, would require such a finding) may be
78 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that operation of a hospital was not a public function)).
217 Mintz, supra note 187, at 368; see Gross, supra note 2, at 238 (“One basis for finding
state action—if the entity is engaged is an activity traditionally reserved for the state—has
questionable applicability to the OPTN because transplantation, and hence organ allocation,
is such a recent innovation.”).
218 Donated human organs are “a public resource and a public trust.” 63 Fed. Reg. at
16,300; see Eric. F. Galen, Organ Transplantation at the Millennium: Regulatory Framework,
Allocation Prerogatives, and Political Interests, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 335, 354 n.102
(1999) (“The public trust doctrine, as applied to organs donated for transplant, suggests that
donated organs are ‘preserved for public use’ and that the government, ‘as trustee for the
people, bears responsibility of preserving and protecting the right of the public to the use’ of
such organs.” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1991))); cf. Roy G. Spece, Jr., A
Fundamental Constitutional Right of the Monied to “Buy Out of” Universal Health Care
Program Restrictions Versus the Moral Claim of Everyone Else to Decent Health Care: An
Unremitting Paradox of Health Care Reform?, 3 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 86 (2007)
(“Rights to purchase . . . organs for transplantation . . . raise medical, scientific, and policy
judgments about the allocation of scarce and uniquely important public resources.”).
219 See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 948–49 (1988)
(“Legislatures are faced with significant choices in determining how to allocate limited
resources in ensuring the[] protections [of life, health, and safety]. Such considerations led
the [Constitutional] Convention to define the powers and obligations of Congress in general
terms, so as to avoid confining congressional action unnecessarily.” (citing The Federalist
No. 44, at 284–85 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
220 See Strosberg & Gimbel, supra note 11, at 229–30.
221 Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 352
(1992) (“If you assume that the purpose of [an] enterprise is to increase the number of
protected interests, then ‘it is crucial to define the liberty at a high enough level to permit
unconventional variants to claim protection.’ If you believe that tradition serves to restrict
the powers of judges to pursue their vision of a good society, then you will choose a lower
level of generality.” (citation omitted)).
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outweighed in the name of some value at odds with finding public
accountability in the circumstances.”222 Therefore, even if the Network’s
policies qualify as state action under one or more of the aboveenumerated tests, a court may nevertheless conclude that the Network is
immune from constitutional claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
That all said, just as courts presumably would not categorically
dismiss claims that the Network violated NOTA or that the Final Rule is
invalid, they likewise should not consider the Network categorically
immune from claims that allocation policies are unconstitutional.223 But,
contrary to Murnaghan, courts should not grant relief—regardless of the
specific allegations at issue—without a more complete investigation.224
Indeed, a considered application of the Winter factors demonstrates that
the TRO in Murnaghan was improvidently granted.225
To begin, the “balance of equities” tipped neither in Sarah’s favor,
nor in favor of other candidates. Sarah was not the only individual who
could have been irreparably harmed by not receiving a lung transplant.
All candidates suffer from the threat of irreparable harm. As far as the
court knew, the next candidate—who would have received Sarah’s first
pair of lungs but for the suspension of the Under 12 Rule—could have
died awaiting another offer.226 Since, the “balance of equities” were in
equipoise in Sarah’s case, granting the TRO was inappropriate.227
222

See Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 295, 303.
Cf. J. Cooper, supra note 167, at 296 (“[T]he court’s decision [in Murnaghan] presents
an opportunity for future transplant candidates to request judicial intervention when they are
unable to receive an organ thereby increasing the scope and number of individual causes of
action.” (citing Girl’s Need Breathes Life into Debate over Organ Allocation, NAT’L PUBLIC
RADIO (June 6, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health
/2013/06/10/189270798/Girls-Need-Breathes-Life-Into-Debate-Over-Organ-Allocation/
(“And then I can start to see other people saying, ‘You know what, I need a liver. I need a
heart. Where’s a federal judge?’”))).
224 Contra DeVito, supra note 142, at 206 (“Judge Baylson was correct in issuing the
TRO and suspending the OPTN policy for lung allocation to those under twelve as it applied
to Sarah’s circumstances and in refraining from issuing a broad-based ruling about the OPTN
under-12 rule in general.”).
225
See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff
seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”).
226 Contra DeVito, supra note 142, at 206 (“A judge should be allowed to create a
temporary solution . . . .” (emphasis added)).
227 The Author recognizes that this situation was terribly fraught for the court: to deny the
TRO would have been to close off the last and only avenue of relief to a dying child with a
colorable claim of discrimination. Yet, despite the deeply compelling nature of Sarah’s case,
a likely dispositive order should not have issued until the court had fully considered the
223
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Furthermore, consideration of the public interest should have
prevented the order. In grappling with this factor, the court should have
asked, e.g., whether injunctive relief would harm the public’s interest in
having a neutrally administered allocation system;228 or, whether an
injunction would disrupt the public’s trust in the system’s fundamental
fairness.229 The problem is that sudden abrogation of policy in individual
circumstances could result in a perception that candidates with access to
the media, or to politicians, or to the courts, receive preferential
treatment—certainly not a result that is in the public interest.
Of course, assuming a showing of a likelihood of success on the
merits (as well as satisfaction of the other three Winter factors) in a case
like Sarah’s,230 a court should grant prospective relief. But, any
restraining order or injunction should be stayed, pending an appeal, to
ensure thorough consideration.231 Ultimately, relief from the application
of Network policy should be reserved for cases in which there is a
substantial demonstration of a violated right, and should not be granted
in expedited hearings that threaten to irreparably harm unrepresented
candidates and traumatize the public’s perception of an equitable
allocation system.

confluence of policy decisions that resulted in her case being brought at all.
228 Cf. Ethics Memo, supra note 50 (“Politicians and judges who intervene in a complex
allocation algorithm may be well-intentioned but fail to consider all the moral variables that
must be balanced at the macro level rather than through an individual candidate’s
experience.”).
229 Cf. Ladin & Hanto, supra note 31, at 599 (“Appeals waged through federal courts. . .
reduce transparency and predictability, undermining the public perception of fairness, which
could reduce donation rates.”). By contrast, the Murnaghan court improperly conflated the
public’s interest with Sarah’s. Cf. Supplemental Mem., supra note 47, at 2 (“[T]he TRO was
very much in the interest of the public as well as . . . Sarah. If, for example, the OPTN decides
to suspend the [Under 12 Rule in the next few days], it would be a tragedy if Sarah were to
die prior to the meeting from remaining ineligible for lungs that would have otherwise become
available if she were treated as an adult.”).
230 Cf. supra Parts III–V (suggesting responses on the merits to Sarah’s regulatory,
statutory, and constitutional claims).
231 At the request of the district court, the Court of Appeals could review this interlocutory
decision on an accelerated timetable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) (“When a district judge,
in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of
the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in
such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action
may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application
is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application
for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge
or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.”); cf. Statistics, DONATE LIFE,
http://donatelife.net/statistics/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2016) (an average of twenty-two people
die every day awaiting a transplant).
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